Introduction
There are three major institutions that publish worldwide population projections: the United Nations Population Division, the US Bureau of the Census and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). In the following analyses we will only use the most recent edition of the UN Population Assessments and Projections which was completed in November 1996. So far, these UN projections have not been officially published -but we had access to an internal data compendium ("Annex I and 11") that will be included in the official publication. The final report of the 1996 UN population projections will be published in early 1997.
We have, of course, also considered using the projections from the IIASA population program (Lutz, 1996) or that of the US Bureau of the Census (1996a). However, the IIASA population scenarios are only available for 13 very large world regions which are ecologically much too diverse for studying linkages between population and land or water resources. The projections of the US Bureau of the Census, on the other hand, are available for specific countries, but cover only the period from 1996 to 2020. This time-frame might be adequate from a methodological point of view, but is rather short for investigating resource constraints. The projections also do not include any indication about the range of uncertainty -such as a lower and higher variant or a probability range. Only the UN Population Assessments and Projections are available for all countries worldwide, include a higher and lower variant, and provide data series ranging from 1950 to 2050 which are long enough for bio-physical research. Moreover, only the UN population projections, which are now published every second year, have a history of more than four decades which makes it possible to assess their predictive accuracy. The World Bank, which formerly published its own projections (Vu, 1985) has canceled this activity and uses the UN data.
Major Demographic Trends
1.1 World population will grow significantly -in spite of falling fertility.
There is one most striking paradox in global population trends: on one hand we have a rapid decline of fertility for more than two decades in many developing countries -not to speak about the already extremely low fertility in most highly developed nations; on the other hand we recently had the largest annual increase of world population in history. Between 1990 and 1995 each year some 85 million people were added to the world population. Why is this the case and what are recent estimates of fertility and population growth?
According to the most recent UN assessment fertility -measured as a global average -began to decline in the mid-1970s. The world population, however will almost certainly continue to grow for several decades to come (see Figure 1 ). According to the UN medium variant projection we will most likely have a global population of about 9.4 billion by 2050. This is somewhat lower than the Population Division's previous estimate of 9.8 billion in the 1994 edition of the World Population Estimates.
Even if one assumes extremely rapid worldwide fertility decline to an average of 1.5 children per woman -which most demographers would consider highly unlikelywe would see a further increase of the world population up to about 7.6 billion people by 2050 (see UN low fertility variant). However, it is not impossible that the global and 2025 Asia's population will grow by 1.35 billion -between 2025 and 2050 the increase will be only 658 million (see Table 2 ).
During the next three decades Africa will contribute another 734 million to the world population -some 15 million more than its current total population. Despite a projected increase in mortality due to AIDS we will not observe a significant slow down of population growth in Africa -not to speak about a decline. Fertility is still so high in Sub-Saharan Africa that it easily can offset the effect of rising (infant and adult) mortality. Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, will have only a moderate population increase of some 213 million between 1995 and 2025. This is due to both the smaller initial size of the population and the significant decline of fertility. Europe's population will almost certainly decline. The UN medium variant projection assumes a shrinking by as much as 27 million during the next three decades.
By far the highest population growth rates can be found in Africa.
While Asia will contribute the largest number of people to modern world population growth, Africa will set the record in growth rates. In Table 2 we have calculated annual grow rates for various periods and all major regions of the world (we have used true exponential growth rates, so that periods of various length can be compared).
Between now and the year 2025 Africa's population is projected to have a exponential annual growth rate of 0.44%, Latin America and the Caribbean will grow by 0.23%, Asia by 0.21%, and Northern America by 0.14%. Europe's population, most likely, will decline by 0.02%.
Please note that these projected growth rates for the next 30 years are actually lower than the historical growth rates during the past 45 years. Between 1950 and 1995 Africa had a exponential annual growth rate of 0.49, Latin America and the Caribbean had 0.44, Asia 0.38 and Northern America had 0.23. Even Europe had a positive growth rate of 0.12 (see Table 2 ). In other words -in the past 45 years Latin America grew twice as fast as it will grow in the next 30 years. We can also see that between 2025 and 2050 the United Nations Population Division assumes much slower population growth than during the next 30 years. While Africa, for instance, is projected to have a growth rate of 0.44 between 1995 and 2025, it should be only 0.26 between 2025 and 2050.
From a methodological point of few these growth rates for the second quarter of the next century are, of course, highly uncertain. But they show that the critical phase of world population growth is during the next three decades. If the world population will increase to only 9.3 billion people, then most of this growth will happen during the next 30 years. If the growth rates will not be down significantly by 2025 we will have a much larger population in 2050.
1.6 The ten countries which will contribute most to world population growth during the next 30 years are India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, United States of America, Bangladesh, Zaire and Iran -in that order! According to the most recent UN population projection India will add more than 400 million to its population between 1995 and 2025 -China will grow by only 260 million (see Table 3 ). The next largest contributor to world population growthsurprisingly -is not Indonesia with its third largest population among developing countries, but Pakistan. Pakistan will grow by about 133 million between 1995 and 2025. An almost equal contribution to world population growth will probably come from Nigeria -127 million. Perhaps unexpected, the next largest contributor to world population growth will be Ethiopia, which will add another 80 million people. Indonesia, on the other hand, will grow by "only" 78 million -which is only rank six in the "hit list'' of contributors to world population growth. The United States will probably grow by 65 million and Bangladesh by 62 million. Few development experts would have put Zaire on a watch list for population problems. But the population in this Central African country is projected to grow by more than 60 million. The tenth largest contributor to world population growth will be Iran -with a population increase of almost 60 million between 1995 and 2025 (see Table 3 ).
1.7 India will out-grow China.
India has one of the oldest family planning programs. It started way back in the 1950s. The country's average fertility, however, declined only slowly. In the early 1950s both China and India had a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 children per woman. But while China's TFR sharply fell to about 2.4 in 1990, it declined only slowly in India and was still above 4 children per woman in 1990. This relatively slow decline of fertility has built up a huge population momentum in India. The country's population structure is much "younger" than that of China. These young adults -born during the high growth period in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s -will have children in the near future. Even if fertility continues to decline to reproductive level by 2020 (as being assumed by the UN projections) the Indian population will probably increase to almost 1.6 billion by 2050 -slightly more than that of China (UN medium variant) (see Figure 3 ). However, India's population might become even much larger. If the average Total Fertility Rate would only decline to 2.6 (instead of 2.1) children per woman in 2020, the population would increase to about 1.9 billion (!) by 2050 (see high UN variant in Figure 3 ).
Nigeria and Pakistan: emerging population giants.
There are not many countries in the world where population projections are more difficult to believe than in Nigeria. If the latest UN projections are correct then our children (and the younger among us) will watch the emergence of an African population giant, well comparable to the most populous Asian nations. In 1950 the West-African country had a population of about 33 million; since then the population has more than tripled. The UN Population Division estimates that Nigeria's population in 1995 was about 112 million (please note that the UN does not revise their estimate according to the most recent Nigerian census, which was significantly lower. Obviously, the UN Population and Statistical Divisions do not consider this census accurate enough). Between now and the year 2050 the country's population will probably triple again and reach almost 339 million (see Figure 4) . If that really happens we will have a ten-fold increase of a 33 million population within one century. This would have no historical precedence. Please note that we are talking about the medium variant UN projection. Based on the demographic parameters it would be not impossible if Nigeria's population would grow even faster.
There are other overwhelmingly Muslim populations with very high population growth rates, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. But none of them is projected to have such a massive absolute increase of the population as Pakistan. In 1950 Pakistan had a population of about 40 million people -and was quite comparable in population size to Bangladesh (42 million), Brazil (54 million) or -for instance -Italy (39 million). Since then Pakistan's population has more than tripled and stood at 136 million in 1995. At that time Brazil was 159 million, Bangladesh 118 million and Italy 57 million. But the real population explosion in Pakistan will come during the next few decades. The population not only has a very large proportion of young men and women in reproductive age, but also still extremely high fertilitymuch higher, for instance, than in Bangladesh or Brazil. These young couples will produce a large number of children even if we assume, as in the UN medium variant, a decline of average fertility to reproductive level (of 2.1 children per woman) by 2020. Pakistan's population will be about 357 million by 2050 (according to the UN medium variant projection) -far larger than that of Bangladesh (218 million), Brazil (243 million) or, of course, Italy (42 million) (see Figure 4) . However, it is (demographically) not impossible, that Pakistan's population increases even further to some 413 million by 2050 (UN high variant projection).
High fertility in the early 1950 was not the only reason for the exceptional population growth of Nigeria and Pakistan. There were other countries which had a similar or even higher level of fertility. Consider the case of Bangladesh and Thailand. The Total Fertility Rate in Bangladesh during the early 1970 was as high as in Nigeria or Pakistan and the initial population size was quite comparable. Yet Bangladesh is projected to have a population of "only" 220 million by 2050 (as compared to Nigeria's 339 million). Thailand is one of the Asian "success stories" in population control. The average TFR was as high as in Nigeria but declined sharply since the 1970s. As a result Thailand will have a very moderate population increase between now and 2050 of only some 14.7 million (see Figure 4 ).
1.9
The global balance of population has shifted significantly between 1950 and 1995. It will change even more dramatically between now and 2050. Europe's share of the world population has sharply declined from 21.7 in 1950 to 12.8 percent in 1995. Africa's share, on the other hand, has increased from 8.9 to 12.7% (see Table 4 ). Today, both Europe and Africa are each home of about one eighth of the world population. This will change significantly in the future. Europe's share of the global population will shrink to about 6.8 percent in 2050. Africa's share will grow to 2 1.8 percent. Hence, one century of population growth will completely reverse Europe's and Africa's position: Europe's share of the global population in 2050 will be the same as that of Africa in 1950 -and vice versa. If the UN medium variant projections turn out to be correct (and there is no sign that they may be utterly wrong) we have to expect a dramatic change in the global balance of population: A much bigger share of the world population will live in Africa-South-of-the-Sahara. In only some 50 years Western Africa, for instance, will have the same population as all of Europe and Eastern Africa will have much more people than all countries of South America, the Caribbean and Oceania combined.
1.10 World-wide, the population will age.
During the next decades the world population structure will inevitably age. This is an unavoidable consequence of large birth cohorts during the 1950s and 1960s and the rapid fertility decline since the 1970s. In 2025 the "baby boomers" of the 1950s and 60s will be between 65 and 75 years of age. These large aging cohorts are followed by the relatively small "baby bust" generations of the worldwide fertility decline.
In 1950 there were only 131 million people of age 65 and older; in 1995 the number of elderly had tripled -it was estimated at 371 million. Between now and the year 2025 it will more than double again, and by 2050 we might have more than 1.4 billion elderly worldwide (see Table 5 ). In 1950 only 5.2 percent of the world population were of age 65 or more -today the percentage has already increased to 6.2 and by 2025 one out of ten people worldwide will be 65 years of age or more.
While currently population aging is most serious in Europe and Japan, Eastern Asia (China) will experience a dramatic increase in the proportion of elderly people by the middle of the next century. This is largely due to the country's success in family planning, which rapidly reduced the relative size of birth cohorts since the 1970s.
The Demographic Momentum
As we have demonstrated with the projections above there is almost no doubt that the world population will grow for quite some time. Of course we can imagine massive natural catastrophes, such as the world being hit by a huge meteor; we can also think about the emergence of a highly contagious lethal virus for which no cure or immunization can be found; or we could be frightened about a worldwide nuclear war that might result in sudden, non-reversible climate change -but short of these highly unlikely events almost nothing could stop the global population from increasing another few billion people. Why are we so sure about this?
First, there is a driving force concealed in the "young" age structure of the world population that just cannot be switched off. Due to high fertility in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in many developing countries large numbers of women (and men) are currently entering reproductive age. The world is full of young adults that will have children. Even if each couple has a smaller number of children than their parents the total number of offsprings will be substantial. This "echo effect" of a high-fertility period in the past creates a "demographic momentum" which works against changes in reproductive behavior that favor smaller families.
Second, it is highly unlikely that large populations will instantly change their reproductive behavior. Certain sections of a population, such as highly educated middle-class couples in urban areas, might adopt radical behavioral change almost overnight, but many developing countries still have large rural populations where fertility is linked to deep-rooted cultural values or social conditions and can decline only gradually over two or three generations. We must also take into account that the average fertility of a population is a composite measure which results from the reproductive behavior of several parent cohorts: these include couples which already have a certain number of children and can only reduce the number of additional offspring. Even in a country like China, where we have a highly controlled society and a most rigorous family planning program, it took 20 years to reduce average fertility from about 6 to 2.4 children. In India -according to UN projections -this process might take 60 years or more.
These two basic facts, which are well known among demographers, tend to slow down demographic change. They can produce a considerable time-lag between the first signs of a fertility decline and a slow down of population growth. In fact, it is quite typical for developing countries that the total number of births increases for one or even two decades, while the fertility (that is the average number of children per woman) already declines. Consider Figure 2 in which we have plotted global population growth together with the change in Total Fertility Rates (TFR) -as being derived from the 1996 round of UN Population Assessments and Projections. Please note that between 1950 and 1995 the chart is based on (estimates of) historical data, while from 1995 to 2050 both the total population and the TFR are projections. Globally, the TFR dropped from about 5 children per woman in 1950 to some 2.9 in 1995; during that same period world population more than doubled from 2.5 to 5.2 billion. The UN assumes a further steep decline of fertility to 2.1 children in 2050. During that period the world population will further increase to 9.3 billion people.
Between 1965 and 1995, while the TFR dropped significantly, the annual increase of the world population grew from about 65 to 85 million. In other words, more and more people were added to the global population, while couples had less and less children (see Figure 2 ).
These contrary trends become even more apparent when we plot indices of the Total Fertility Rate, the average annual increase of the population and the annual population growth rates. For the five-year period of 1950-55 the indices are set to 100 (see Figure 5 ). This "paradox" is simply a consequence of the fact that the increase in the number of parents outpaced the decline in fertility. In fact this situation will continue for some time. According to the most recent UN projections we will have a stable annual increase of about 80 million people until 2015 -only then will this increase gradually decline to about 47 million in 2050. By the middle of the next century the world population will still grow by about the same number of people as in 1950 -only the total number of people on the planet will be more than three times larger.
What do we not know about future population growth?
We know that fertility is declining almost everywhere. But we do not know how fast and to which level it will fall. There is not much indication that some Islamic countries, such as Pakistan or the Gulf states in Western Asia, will have significantly lower fertility in the near future. On the other hand there are signs that fertility is dropping even faster than expected in several other Asian and even African countries. This would result in a smaller world population than previously expected. Some researchers even believe that the global population could stabilize somewhat below 10 billion people in the long run ( I~t z , 1996) . Of course, this -to a large extent -is based on educated speculation, since it depends on assumptions about changes in reproductive behavior of people who are not even born today. There is great controversy among demographers whether these assumptions can be justified: some highly respected demographers, such as Nathan Keyfitz or Joel E. Cohen have argued that population projections are impossible beyond 10 or 15 years (Keyfitz, 198 1; Cohen, 1995) . Others have applied sophisticated methodologies such as probabilistic projections to calculate even very long-term projections (or scenarios) up to the year 2100 (Lutz, 1996) . Those who have regularly conducted world population projections for more than 3 decadessuch as the UN Population Division -can argue that their projections were fairly accurate if compared with the actual development (see Table 5 ).
The debate is still undecided. The only thing we know for sure is that there is a high degree of uncertainty for any projection that expands over more than 2 or 3 decades. One reason for this uncertainty is the high sensitivity of long-term projections to different assumptions on the timing and speed of the fertility decline. Even if all demographers would agree that fertility will come down to 2.1 children per woman in 2050 (which is the current UN assumption) a few years delay in this decline or a somewhat slower pace can make a difference for the world population of several billion people.
So far we have only talked about fertility. Of course this is a crude simplification. The real trouble begins when we take into account future changes in mortality. It was conventional wisdom among demographers for quite some time that mortality is not a very important issue when it comes to population projections: the developing countries would simply follow the trends in the developed world which were thought to have already stabilized. The lowest level of infant mortality would be around 10 deaths per 1000 life births and the maximum life expectancy would be about 82.5 years for men and 87.5 years for women (this was the UN assumption since their 1988 round of projections). However, things have changed unexpectedly: First, there is an ongoing decline in mortality in many developed countries. Especially adult and old-age mortality is falling quite significantly for both men and women. Average life expectancy in some of these populations (such as in Austria) has increased by about 2 years per decade during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. A growing number of people are approaching ages that were previously considered a biological upper limit of the human life span. Micro-biological and genetic research has made a big step forward to understand (and possibly manipulate) the process of aging. It is not impossible that human life can be significantly expanded in the future by a combination of dietary practices, specific drugs and genetic therapy.
Second, the expected across-the-board decline of mortality in the developing world has not materialized. While some developing countries, such as China, have seen a spectacular increase in life expectancy, others have lagged behind or, in fact, have even experienced recent declines. Especially for Africa-South-of-the-Sahara previous assumptions might have been overoptimistic -given the high prevalence of HIV-infection and AIDS, newly spreading tropical diseases and widespread violent conflicts.
Both trends have added uncertainty to our population projections -or rather made us aware of the uncertainty that was already there. While the prospects of increasing longevity among highly developed populations might only amplify their structural problems of aging, it is the new threat from AIDS and other causes in developing countries which could have a significant impact on world population growth. So far this is not in sight, but no one knows the future of the AIDS epidemic in India or other populous Asian countries. There is indication, for instance, that HIV infection is spreading rapidly in India and Thailand (US Bureau of the Census, 1996b).
The best strategy for reducing this uncertainty in population projections is to regularly revise the estimates, based on most recent demographic evidence. The UN Population Division has an excellent record for continuously fine-adjusting their estimates. Also, their early estimates from the 1960s seem to have been remarkably accurate for the year 2000 (see Table 5 ).
Estimating the balance of remaining land with cultivation potential
In this section we discuss to what extent the availability of land resources in the less developed countries can be expected to support the unprecedented population growth that will occur over the next 2 to 3 decades in many regions. The aim is to estimate the amount of land that from climatic, edaphic and topographic conditions may be adjudged the capability to sustain food crop production. Furthermore, we are interested in the relative quality of these lands, their broad geographic distribution as well as the major type of ecosystems that presently cover these areas.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), together with IIASA, has developed and widely applied a methodological framework for assessments of land productivity which originally was designed for use in agricultural development planning and natural resources management (FAO, 1978-81; FAOIIIASA, 1993; Fischer & van Velthuizen, 1996) . A first assessment comparing crop production potential to minimum food requirements concluded that, overall, less developed regions would be able to feed their growing populations (FAO/IIASA/UNFPA, 1982). Agroecological zoning (AEZ) involves the inventory, characterization and classification of the land resources in a way meaningful for assessments of the potential of agricultural production systems. This characterization of land resources includes components of climate, soils and landform, basic for the supply of water, energy, nutrients and physical support to plants.
Crops require heat, light and water in varying amounts. The geographic distribution of crops is mainly governed by these climatic elements. Temperature, water and solar radiation are key climatic parameters which condition the net photosynthesis and allow crops to accumulate dry matter according to the rates and patterns which are specific to individual crop species. Crops have specific temperature requirements for their growth and development, and prevailing temperatures set the limits of crop performance when moisture (and radiation) requirements are met. Vice versa, when temperature requirements are met, the growth of a crop is largely dependent on how well the length of its growth cycle matches the period when water is available. In the AEZ approach, this has led to the concept of the length-of-growing-period (1,GP) which is defined as the period (in days) during the year in which water availability and prevailing temperature can sustain crop growth.
Crop performance depends as well on the availability of nutrients in the soil, its capacity to store water and to provide mechanical support for crops. Therefore, agroecological zoning also includes an inventory of relevant soil and landform characteristics. The specific combinations of climatic, soil and terrain inventories form the basic land resources units of analysis.
Technical specifications (including management) within a socio-economic setting under which a specific crop is grown have been defined as land utilization types (LUT). Crop suitability assessments, in essence, are based on matching of crop specific adaptability characteristics and LUT ecological requirements with the attributes of individual land units.
Estimating the extent of land with crop production potential
To estimate the scope for expanding agriculture in response to population growth in developing countries and to assess the possible impact on forest ecosystems of increasing the extents of cultivated land a rather detailed assessment of land resources and land with rainfed cultivation potential was carried out at IIASA to provide inputs to a F A 0 study World Agriculture: Towards 201 0 (FAO, 1995) . Some of the calculation steps were recently repeated using additional data and procedures, involving five main steps: quantifying land with cultivation potential; delineation of protected areas; subtracting land for habitation and infrastructure; overlaying of global ecosystems database; subtraction of land currently in cultivation.
The input for the evaluation of land with rainfed crop production potential consists of several geo-referenced data-sets: (a) the inventory of soil and land form characteristics from the FAO-UNESCO Soil Map of the World (SMW) (FAO, 1991) ; and (b) the inventory of climate regimes in which data on temperature, rainfall, relative humidity, wind speed and global radiation are used together with information on evapotranspiration, to characterize the thermal regimes and length of growing periods. The digitized inventories were overlaid to create a land resources inventory composed of several hundred thousands of land units, i.e., pieces of land of varying size with unique soil, land form and climate attributes.
Each land unit was tested for its suitability to grow any of the selected 21 major agricultural crops, under three levels of technology. (The crops are: millet, sorghum, maize, spring wheat, winter wheat, barley, bunded rice, upland rice, sweet potato, cassava, white potato, phaseolus bean, groundnut, soybean, cowpea, chickpea, oil palm, sugarcane, banana, olive and cotton.)
The estimated yields for each land unit, crop and technology alternative were then compared with those obtainable under the same major climate zone but without soil and terrain constraints, the latter yields being termed the maximum constraint-free yield.
Any piece of land so tested, or part thereof, is classified as suitable for rainfed crop production if at least one of the crops could be grown under any one of the three technology alternatives with a yield of 20 percent or more of the maximum constraintfree yield for that management level. If more than one crop met this criterion, the amount of land classified as suitable was determined on the basis of the crop which could use the largest part of the land unit. Land units where none of the 21 crops met this criterion were classified as not suitable (NS) for rainfed crop production.
The land assessed as having potential for rainfed crop production is further classified into three broad suitability classes. When simulated crop yields were within 80 to 100 percent of maximum constraint-free yield the land was classified as very suitable (VS); suitable (S) when within 40 to 80 percent; and marginally suitable (MS) when assessed yield levels were between 20 to 40 percent. For presentation of results we consider five aggregate land classes, based on the combination of moisture conditions and crop suitability, as used by F A 0 (1988, 1995 
Delineation of protected areas
When land is indicated as legally defined protected (national parks, conservation forest and wildlife reserves) the respective land units are evaluated for cultivation potential but not considered available for agricultural expansion. In the study, the relevant data were available for 63 of the developing countries. Maps and inventories of National Parks, Conservation Forest and Wildlife Reserves (IUCN, 1990) were made available by the World Conservation and Monitoring Centre (Cambridge, UK) and provided to IIASA by the FAO. The data on protected areas are georeferenced and thus could be overlayed on the land resources inventory. These areas delineated in the G I s occupy a total of almost 400 million ha, i.e., about 6 percent of the total land area in developing countries (excluding China). Of this, around 200 million ha were assessed as having some potential for crop cultivation representing about 8 percent of the total extent with crop cultivation potential.
Subtraction of land for habitation and infrastructure
We have also attempted to broadly estimate the amount of land currently used for habitation and infrastructure occupying areas assessed as having cultivation potential (Heilig, 1994) . Detailed information to estimate region specific land use for these purposes is scarce. The functional relationship parameterized in the study relies mainly on county-level data from China. It expresses per capita use of land for habitation and infrastructure in relation to population density. Examples of the parameterization are as follows: at 35 persons per km2 the simulated requirement is 50 ha per 1000 people (hence 1.75 percent of the land), at 150 persons per km2 the use is 26 ha per 1000 people (i.e., 3.9 percent of the land), at 675 persons per km2 the use is 20 ha per 1000 persons (some 13.5 percent of the land), etc. Based on a georeferenced dataset of population density the respective subtraction of land for habitation and infrastructure purposes is carried out in each land unit.
Overlaying of global ecosystems database on the land with cultivation potential
To estimate the distribution of ecosystems among land assessed as having rainfed crop production potential a global ecosystems digital database (Kineman & Ohrenschall, 1992) . was overlayed with the land resources data. The dataset is coded on a lo' by lo' latitudellongitude raster of grid-cells providing an adequate resolution for regional studies. 60 ecosystems classes are distinguished in the dataset which were aggregated into 12 aggregate land-cover categories as shown in Appendix A. The G I s operation overlaying the results of the agro-ecological assessment with the global ecosystems database was tabulated by country to derive the distribution of ecosystems within land classes with cultivation potential. Tabulation of land resources both by detailed and aggregate classes has been carried out. For presentation here, the results were then further aggregated according to broader geographic regions.
Subtraction of land currently under cultivation
The steps previously described resulted in geographically explicit accounts of land with cultivation potential characterized in terms of major ecosystems classes. Finally, to subtract from these the land areas currently under cultivation two main data sources were relied upon: a digital copy of the accounts of cultivated land compiled by F A 0 (1995; data in Appendix 5), and the distribution of farmland ecosystem classes found in the global ecosystems database. It includes 10 ecosystems classes of pure or mixed agricultural use which were merged into 3 aggregated land-cover categories. We anticipate that activities currently underway by the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP) to develop high resolution global datasets on land cover and elevation (Townshend, 1992) will help to improve the accuracy of our estimation.
Regional land balances of areas with cultivation potential obtained by applying the 5-step procedure previously described are presented in Appendix B, a summary for all less developed countries is shown in Table 6 (for an explanation of table entries refer to  Table 6B in Appendix B).
How well do land and water resources match the anticipated regional population momentum
As a first check to what extent the balance of remaining land with cultivation potential would enable the various regions to cope with the demographic trends outlined in sections 1 to 3, demand for arable land was estimated under crude assumptions for projected year 2030 and 2050 population levels. In the simplest case it is assumed that1: (a) the additional demand for cultivated land increases linearly with population; (b) only a fraction, overall in the order of 20 percent but varying with region, of the additional agricultural output needed will have to be met from expanding cultivated land. In specifying this fraction, we have broadly adopted the assumptions of F A 0 (1995) (see Table 7 ). For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa about 30 percent of the contribution to total crop production increases is assumed to be derived from expansion of cultivated land. For land-scarce Asian regions this is assumed to be only about 5 percent. Table 8 summarizes the calculations using population levels projected for years 2030 and 2050 (UN, 1997 . The share of production increases not accounted for by expanding cultivated land would have to come from intensification, i.e., higher yields, reduced fallow periods and a larger number of crops per year. Table 8 compares, for groups of countries in less developed regions, the additional need for cultivated land estimated under these assumptions to the balance of land potentially available. Even under these very mild conditions the populous region of South-central Asia and the land-scarce Western Asia region are not likely to have enough suitable land resources to meet even only 5 to 10 percent of the required production increases from expansion of cultivated land, Western Africa reaching close to the limits.
Land cover change, in particular deforestation, has been identified as a key factor contributing to global environmental change (Turner et al., 1993) . Alterations of the carbon pools, changes in albedo and the balance of sensible and latent heat fluxes, the impacts on total runoff and runoff speed, and the concern about loss of ecological complexity and biodiversity have prompted the international research community to focus their attention on the impacts of land-use and land cover change (Turner et al., 1995; Fischer et al., 1996) . It is therefore of interest to assess the balance of land remaining when setting aside land with crop production potential which is currently covered by ecologically highly valued ecosystems such as forest or wetland ecosystems. If this condition were to be strictly applied, six out of eleven developing regions would not be able to meet the stipulated increases in cultivated land, as forests and wetlands cover on average about two thirds of the balance of land with cultivation potential.
A detailed discussion of water resources availability and future water use is beyond the scope of this paper. In the past, various studies have been devoted to the subject of water resources such as the work by Baumgartner & Reichel (1975 ), L'vovich (1979 ), Shiklomanov & Markova (1987 , Falkenmark (1989) , and Shiklomanov (1990) . A comprehensive analysis and collection of data is contained in Gleick (1993). Kulshreshtha (1993) considers several scenarios of future water demand and supply at national level.
As a crude measure of regional vulnerability with respect to water resources, we look at the regional levels of annual renewable freshwater water resources available per capita, and their change with respect to altered population levels. Countries are grouped into three broad categories with regard to the availability of water resources. Water experts suggest that regions with an annual renewable freshwater water resource of less than 1000 m3/caplyear should be regarded as water scarce. When water supply ranges between 1000 to 2000 m3lcaplyear water stress is likely to occur. Only at levels exceeding 2000 m3lcaplyear regions are considered to have abundant water supplies. Data reported by the World Resources Institute (WRI, 1996) and population levels projected by the UN (UN, 1997) were used to flag regions where population pressure may results in water stress as defined above. Table 9 shows results of such classification for both developed and developing regions. In 1995, three of the less developed regions, namely Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Asia are considered to experience water scarcity or stress. By 2030 this number increases to six, adding Eastern Africa, South-central Asia and Eastern Asia. Western Africa would join the ranks of water stressed regions between 2030 to 2050.
Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed what is known and expected about future population development. Regional differences in demographic change were presented and population increase was compared with estimates of land and water resources availability. From this analysis some key conclusions can be drawn:
The 1996 UN Population Estimates and Projections indicate a 65 percent increase in world population between 1995 to 2050. Population numbers in developed regions will, in the aggregate, approximately remain at the current level. All the growth will occur in less developed countries, increasing their numbers by more than 80 percent. There is also a wide variation of projected population increases among less developed regions. The largest increases, in percentage terms, between 1995 to 2050 are projected for Sub-Saharan African regions, namely in Middle Africa (240%), Eastern Africa (215%) and Western Africa (205%). These are followed by Western Asia (130%) and Southern Africa (125%). In absolute terms, however, the largest increase will occur in South-central Asia, an addition of some 1.15 billion people during the projected 55 years.
Most of the population growth will already occur until year 2030. While there are many uncertainties involved when projecting demographic changes to 2050 and beyond, the projection methods are fairly robust and show little variation when applied to the next 2 to 3 decades. An assessment of the extent of land with rainfed cultivation potential has concluded that land resources in less developed regions could allow crop production on some 2.5 billion hectares. An estimated 900 million hectares have been under cultivation at around 1990, leaving a balance of 1.6 billion hectares. Some 30 percent of these extents are adjudged only marginal suitability due to severe soil and landform limitations, excessive wetness conditions or drought hazard. The distribution of land resources is rather uneven. Of the 1.6 billion hectares of the balance of land with potential for rainfed crop production almost half (47%) is located in Latin America, some 45% in Africa, and only 8% in Asia. Overall, it is estimated that two thirds of the balance of land with rainfed cultivation potential is currently covered by various forest ecosystems, wetlands and mangroves. The respective percentages by region vary between 23% in Southern Africa to 89% in South-eastern Asia. For Latin America and Asia the estimated share of the balance of land with cultivation potential under forest and wetland ecosystems is about 70 percent, in Africa this is about 60%. If these were to be preserved, the remaining balance of land with some potential for rainfed crop cultivation would amount to 550 million hectares. In addition to the uneven spread of land and water resources time is an important factor as well. The rapid population growth during the next 3 decades will leave little time to develop land and water resources along a sustainable path. The regions which will experience the largest difficulties in meeting future demand for land resources and water, or alternatively have to cope with much increased dependency on external supplies, can clearly be identified from our analysis. These include foremost Western Asia, South-central Asia, and Northern Africa. A large stress on resources is to be expected also in many countries of Eastern, Western and Southern Africa (Heilig, 1996) .
Recent initiatives to establish global monitoring and observation systems as well as national and international programmes to study the driving forces and impacts of landuse and land-cover changes will result in much improved information that will allow to assess the conditions and prospects for expanding food production more precisely than was possible here. Our analysis demonstrates that such understanding is of utmost importance and urgency.
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